#6months of Algeria

What happened.

Domestically, significant changes have been made to the leadership of some of the country's most important institutions this semester. At the end of August, President Tebboune replaced Prime Minister Nadir Larbaoui — who had held office since November 2023 — with Sifi Ghrieb, the then Minister of Industry. Ghrieb did not make any significant changes to the ministerial team, except to remove the key responsibilities relating to renewable energy from the Minister of Energy and Mines, Mohammed Arkab. The new prime minister emphasised the need to diversify the economy, especially through promoting industry and agricultural modernisation, and to strengthen the social character of the state as the two main pillars of government. In addition, we saw the dismissal of the director of counterintelligence (DGSI) in May, followed by his arrest despite rumours of his escape to Spain, and the sudden replacements in some key public companies, including Sonatrach (its third director general since 2020) and Sidar El Hajar (now Alsolb), with no official reason given for the dismissals.

Several developments took place in the judicial arena this semester, including the confirmation on appeal of the convictions of the writer Boualem Sansal (later pardoned) and the scholar Amine Belghit (who received three years for his statements questioning the Amazigh identity of the country). Three candidates in the last presidential election in 2024 also received reduced sentences for alleged irregularities in those elections: Saida Neghza, Belkacem Sahli, and Abdelhakim Hamadi had their sentences reduced from ten to four years.

In economic terms, the country continues to face excessive dependence on hydrocarbons (which account for around 90% of exports) and insufficient private initiative, despite the IMF's positive growth forecasts of 3.4% for 2025. This semester has seen important developments aimed at improving and boosting the economy, including Algeria's acceptance into the New Development Bank of the BRICS+, the replacement of the ineffective Foreign Trade Promotion Agency (Algex), the hosting of the significant International Intra-African Trade Fair (IATF), and recognised efforts to be removed from the FATF's 'grey list' (despite being designated a 'high-risk' country for money laundering by the European Parliament). Nevertheless, the country's economic growth continues to be driven by gas and oil, as evidenced by the signing of various contracts for joint exploration and exploitation of deposits with several foreign companies, including Filada, Zangas, Sinopec and ENI. Unsurprisingly, Minister Arkab himself announced a $60 billion investment plan for strategic energy projects by 2030.

Finally, the new general mobilisation law came into force at the end of July. This law aims to optimise the transition of the army and public institutions to a state of war, should it be necessary, and to regulate the subjugation of all state and industrial resources to the needs of the armed forces. This could be considered a preparatory step by Algeria towards a potential armed conflict in the region.

In terms of foreign policy, this semester was once again primarily characterised by the long-standing diplomatic clash with France, which began in 2024 when president Macron recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Several incidents have exacerbated the serious confrontation between the two states, including the failed kidnapping of Algerian blogger 'Amir DZ' near Paris, which led to arrests after pointing the finger at the Algerian embassy; the Algerian government banning executives of several public companies (Sonatrach, Sonegaz and Sonatrem) from travelling to France; Boualem Sansal's conviction being upheld on appeal (he was pardoned a few days ago by Tebboune through the mediation of the German president); and the French National Assembly approving a resolution, initiated by the far right, calling for the repeal of the 1968 migration agreements. Conversely, one of the main causes of the clash appears to have disappeared: the controversial Minister of the Interior, Bruno Retailleau, was dismissed following the government reshuffle. His replacement in the second Le Cornu government, Laurent Nuñez, has stated that a “diplomatic standoff” with Algeria is not working and has called for a “return to dialogue” to re-establish collaboration, particularly in the area of migration.

During this period, there has also been a significant rapprochement between Algeria and the US. Despite being subject to one of Trump's highest tariffs (30%), the country continues to seek closer bilateral relations with Washington in all areas. After surprising everyone at the beginning of the year by signing a MoU to 'expand military cooperation', September saw a visit from the commander of AFRICOM Special Forces, who praised Algeria's success in fighting terrorism. In October, the destroyer USS Roosevelt docked in the capital's port, and its commander expressed a desire to 'strengthen relations' to 'ensure freedom of navigation and economic prosperity in North Africa'. Indeed, Algeria would seek to take advantage of Trump's new approach to “transactional” diplomacy by offering the US increased economic and energy cooperation. Unsurprisingly, Tebboune himself received executives from Chevron and ExxonMobil, with whom he discussed the possibility of signing new oil and gas exploration and production contracts. In this regard, the US has also recently expressed its strong interest in 'pacifying' the region. This is a task that has been entrusted to the White House's special envoy for Africa, Massad Boulos, who met with Tebboune, Arkab and Attaf in July. Another key figure involved is Steve Witkoff, the 'fixer' of the Gaza ceasefire, who surprised everyone before the important Security Council vote on the Sahara by stating that the US would achieve a 'peace agreement' between Morocco and Algeria 'in sixty days'.

Meanwhile, Spain has managed to put an end to the diplomatic tensions that began when the Sánchez government changed its position on Western Sahara in March 2022. Since Algiers lifted trade barriers in November last year, there have been repeated high-level meetings: President Sánchez met then-Prime Minister Larbaoui in Seville; Foreign Minister Albares met Attaf twice on the sidelines of international forums; and Interior Minister Grande-Marlaska exchanged visits with his counterpart Sayoud, with whom he is seeking to improve cooperation on migration issues. Unsurprisingly, there has recently been a sharp increase in the number of migrants arriving from Algeria, particularly to the Balearic Islands. On the commercial front, relations appear to have fully normalised, with the Algerian Minister of Foreign Trade himself expressing a desire to establish a 'reinforced partnership' with Spain. Evidence of this can be seen in Algeria's regaining third place in container traffic with the port of Valencia.

In the Maghreb region, the country enjoys excellent relations with Tunisia under Kais Saïed; unsurprisingly, the two countries have signed a defence agreement and seek to align their positions on regional security issues, particularly with regard to the Libyan conflict. There have been no serious incidents with Morocco during this six-month period, even during the youth protests in the kingdom last October. In contrast, the biggest ongoing crisis is with Mali. After heated exchanges during the week of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, Mali filed a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice regarding the alleged shooting down of one of its drones on its territory by Algeria. This dispute is taking place amid a serious threat to the survival of the Bamako government, which is facing jihadist pressure and an oil supply blockade imposed by the Al-Qaeda affiliate (JNIM) on the capital.

What's next.

The various rapprochements that have taken place in recent months between the US administration and the Algerian government seem to indicate a certain reconsideration of Algiers' international priorities, moving away from more intransigent traditional positions.

This can be seen in Algeria's current relationship with Russia, a historic ally from which it has distanced itself slightly since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. Algeria has established itself as an alternative gas supplier to Europe, causing Moscow to lose leverage. The deterioration of relations has been exacerbated further since Wagner paramilitaries (now ‘Africa Corps’) entered Mali and other countries in the central Sahel, which Algeria considers ‘its neighbourhood’.

Secondly, the harmony between Washington and Algiers was evident in the recent Security Council vote on extending MINURSO. Algeria did not participate in this vote, which was later acknowledged to be due to the presence of the words ‘Moroccan sovereignty’ in the text. Indeed, it seems that the Algerian delegation played an important role in modifying the initial drafts, which proposed autonomy as the 'only framework', although they did not manage to fully amend the preamble. Nevertheless, the fact that Algeria abstained from voting on the resolution is significant in terms of a potential rapprochement with the US, the resolution's penholder, and a willingness to end the long-standing dispute in the Sahara. This would require the establishment of a formula that respects the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Although the Algerian representative to the Security Council expressed regret at the missed opportunity, stating that 'the momentum and conditions for the success of Trump's peace initiative' were not yet in place, the Algerian ambassador to the US subsequently clarified that any solution must involve dialogue between Morocco and the Polisario Front, and that Algeria will respect the terms of any agreement reached between the two parties.

The Western Sahara dossier will therefore play a major role in the next six months. It remains to be seen whether De Mistura will be able to bring all parties together, directly or indirectly, to negotiate within the framework set out in the resolution. According to the diplomat, however, this resolution 'has not prescribed an outcome'. It also remains to be seen whether the Algerian government will take up the baton thrown down by King Mohammed VI to 'launch a sincere and fraternal dialogue together' on an autonomy initiative that Morocco has committed to detailing.

This semester, we will observe how the diplomatic conflict with France evolves, and whether it is ultimately resolved. The release of Boualem Sansal and the formation of a new government in Paris are hopeful signs, and there is even talk that Macron and Tebboune could meet at the G20 summit at the end of this month. However, with the French presidential election due to take place in 2026, it is also possible that rhetoric will become more radical and the confrontation will persist, encouraged by the Élysée candidates themselves.

Spain must seize this opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations and boost economic exchanges and investments. It remains to be seen, however, whether this excellent climate of political and economic understanding will be reflected in improved figures for irregular migration from Algeria, as this could have repercussions for Spain's domestic policy.